By On Tuesday, September 17th, 2013 Categories : Review

Benhabib’s work is a path-breaking contribution to a topic that only recently has received the interest it deserves in this global justice debate. Issues of membership, immigration, and admission had been relatively absent in politics philosophy. Benhabib’s own conception of the “right to have rights” inherits this Arendtian reflections upon this tragic fate of minorities inside twentiethcentury Europe during successive patterns of persecution, denationalization, expulsion, and extermination. These convulsions that accompanied the earth Wars and led to the creation of the Little league of Nations, the Not, and the 1948 UDHR reflected the vulnerability of the individuals entitled to widespread human rights but deprived of an state that would actually enact these protections. Benhabib’s work takes this specific rich Arendtian legacy and develops a conception associated with just membership for a world that the relations of interdependency plus the possibilities of interaction help to configure a more serious cosmopolitan horizon. These same historical conditions of inescapable coexistence and enhanced interactions support a reinterpretation of the Kantian cosmopolitan right of hospitality plus the obligation to enter into a global juridical community.
Benhabib’s conception of the “right to have rights” reconciles the immanent criticism of the Critical Theory tradition that has a normative standard for transcending the Westphalian system from the emergence of cosmopolitan norms. Benhabib’s early proposal of Interactive Universalism addresses some of the main criticisms directed to the Habermasian paradigm of Discourse Ethics by feminist, communitarian, and postmodern thinkers. Her alternative account health supplements the idealized conditions associated with equal respect that take the interlocutor being a “generalized other” with a conception of an “concrete other” that is sensitive to the contingent, embodied, and contextual elements which frame the singular perspective of the other. This reformulation of this deliberative conditions relaxes the pressure to realize a consensus and emphasizes the need to conceive deliberative practices because open processes oriented make it possible for an enlarged mentality. Such a practice associated with reason-giving depends on a chance to approach the other’s concrete perspective and on the reflexive reformulation of this subject’s own identity. That conception of Interactive Universalism is further elaborated and politically fleshed away as Democratic Iterations, stressing a chance to adopt and adapt correct claims.
This practice additionally enables the legal concretization associated with abstract universal standards, such as core human rights, through self-governing peoples. The aforementioned iterations provide methods to defend the universality associated with human rights without promoting a unified juridical way of life. Following the thread associated with Interactive Universalism, the practice of boasting rights across borders and boundaries is in line with a conception of human rights that relies on a deliberative process about what we should can accept as logical claims for rights. It’s possible to encapsulate the underlying theoretical presuppositions inside the following way: Any political justification associated with human rights (juridical universalism) presupposes strong beliefs around the normative content of individual reason (justificatory universalism), and such belief rests on the recognition of the other’s to accept as valid only those rules which might be expressed with convincing causes through practices of the same respect and communicative freedom (moral universalism). The account of human agency that is at the base with this communicative justification of rights can be expressed when it comes to “generalized” and “concrete” some other. It does not be determined by any controversial and essentialist outline of human nature (no essentialist universalism).
The “right to have rights” is a non-state-centric conception of only membership that affirms that human being has the right to be a member of a politics community in which his or her basic interests are given due respect. This formulation expresses this “principle of right” of an legal cosmopolitan position in whose core concept would include some minimal conditions seen in the documents of this human rights regime, for example the rights to life, liberty (including protections resistant to the various forms of slavery and serfdom), personal property or home, equal freedom of idea and religion, expression, organization, representation and, crucially, the best of self-government.
The “schedule associated with rights, ” that is, the legitimate variation in the core list of rights that is institutionalized in a politics community, represents the manifestation of collective self-government, restricted to binding cosmopolitan norms. Even so, the practice of Democratic Version, as an empirical activity of an self-governing demos, represents a delicate balance relating to the expression of democratic legitimacy and cosmopolitan justification. Nothing in this delicate equilibrium precludes which a demos could reach undesirable exclusionary agreements which are inconsistent with the fair representation of the interests of all affected participants thereby generate norms that neglect to express universal moral admiration or egalitarian reciprocity. The “right to have rights” differs from some other conceptions of human rights in that no aim to reduce human rights into a membership right, and because it conceives the right of self-government being a fundamental determinant of the product range of legitimate variation inside the content of basic individual rights. In this perception, Benhabib distinguishes between “mere regular membership rights, ” which simply take into consideration one’s interests in nondemocratic organisations, and “just membership rights” that provide one’s interests proper factor through adequate participatory channels.