THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY – BOOK REVIEW

Chapters 1-4 are an opening movement of the slow pace . The classical theories of political authority are divided into FP ( formal procedure ) and SP ( background theories of the subject) . Interaction governed by rules and statutes adopting the two control – maker and knowledge of the rules follower of the core beliefs and values ​​that contribute to creating the rule. The authority including four this context can not be explained by theories FP (86 ) . Chapter 5 presents the themes that the authority of the remaining chapters dominate are generally taken to ” judge ” by involving its nationals; authority may be justified only if the false accusation shows. Flathman with much subtlety prominent position of authority ( eg political authority ) an authority ( eg Sir Kenneth Clark Art History ) ( 93 , see also 1 ( FIF ) , domination or manipulation ( 99 ) , must respect politeness . Everyone ( 102 ) , and to do what is to be the merits or the best thing to do (104 ) Practice Authority is rooted in the faith and shared values ​​assumed and hence requires Flathman ( 106 … see Ch 6 passim ) . isolated on the surrender of judgment analysis in Chapters 7 and 8 of the relationship between the government and power needed woolly . capacity differs from the strength, power and violence (see 162 ) , because, as authority is rooted in shared beliefs and values , and thus miss allocation of judgment . ability but did not distinguish between intra authority and ultra vires . ( 164 ) After a summary chapter (Chapter 9 ) , Chapter 10 , part II begins , and the issue of justification , introduced a another key concept , ‘agency’ – . more or less continuous and efficient capacity utilization self – powered drive , deliberate and rational ( 177 ) Authority is justified if and only if it is not only compatible , but also promotes a satisfactory level of the agency. Moreover, the authority i / after practice justified . Rousseau is shown to approach the ideal of Flathman than most other theorists ( 183-97 ), but it assumes absolutist axiology that there is no room for agency dissidents ( own perspective 199ff ) leaves . Flathman allows dissidents to the agency with respect to exercise. interpretation of beliefs and common values ​​accept the dissident and support them , deserve to obey the respect of choosing that authority even if his dissent specific guidelines the authority . the possibility of dissent can never be eliminated , the Flathman subsidies , but is expected if the government is a Wittgensteinian practice, however , the justification for the authority is not the suppression of dissent needed .. What are the advantages of the theory of Wittgenstein Flathman on other theories ? Flathman convincingly demonstrates the superiority of his theory that he criticizes in fact. His closest rival would be different HLA Hart in the concept of law , despite the reluctance of Heart to the term “authority” ( cf. CL , p . 20 ) to use . Normative vision F’latlunan an open society imbued with respect for the dignity seen as justified and as dissidents authority is much more attractive than the “voluntary cooperation in a coercive system ” infamous Heart ( CL , p . 193 ) . Methodologically , both good results of a hostility to the essentialist definition and careful recognition of the complexity of the civil association episteniology The political value judgments is insufficient , assumed the position of Flathman than in Hart , it is possible to find a solution . Improvement The first question is simple: how can we reject both FP and SP theories of authority? The answer – effect Flathman There are substantive criteria of faith ( F theories’ – P is false) , but they are not determined by the values ​​, the law – transcendental wild type ( ie theories are false SP ) . Fair enough , and so far Wittgenstein good . But now comes another question, if the normative justification of government is based on simple beliefs and shared values ​​, ” the contract of opinions” in the words of Wittgenstein , instead of agreement in judgments ” ( Phil LNV 241 – . 242 ) is inevitable and there is unbearable perspective Flathman to his name sees this objection comes and spends chapter 14 a refutation – the ” subjective” element should be emphasized , because it is part of the agency ( 235 ) , the standards are not perspective , as there are enough similarities between the known value and beliefs ( 239 ) . This is stupid . Commonalities emerge as mere accidents on a cosmic scale . it is justifiable nol enough for really substantive criteria for the power of the anarchist . justified authority must dissent outside ( Flathman is good about ( 235 ) ) , but this is impossible as ” the practice of authority is that all subscribers or participants make their words and actions ” ( 231 , his italics ) .
Position Flathman but is a new and highly sophisticated theory FP . Understanding the “rule” is richer than, say Oakeshott , but it’s still legalistic conception . Tempo Flathman the theory forums offer a slot in which a particular association slips her substantive criteria is not enough to make . Itself a theory that provides a normative justification of authority. Ironically , Flathman itself explicitly states without realizing his own answer to the problem of Wittgenstein meaning. In two passages ( 80ff , 142ff ) Flathman IHE refers to ” general facts of nalure ” Wittgenstein spoke often and are also part of his concept of a “rule” . It is clear from On Certainty (see esp . 96ff and Shiner , Philosophy 1974 Proc . Da laugh I. Soc . 1977-1978 ) that Wittgenstein considered ihese general facts restrict the content ( humanly ) possible rules (and thus beliefs and values ) , or mathematical , scientific , ethical , political or otherwise. The doctrine of ” minimum content of natural law ” ( CL , c . Ix ) Heart is a theory about how to limit the content of the faith in a society , the general facts of nature and also do eg ” natural necessity ” ( cf. CL , 195 ) p . , not by cosmic accident. The call for ” general facts of nature ” principle is a normative justification of authority ground than coincidental similarities Flathman while still avoiding excess absolutist he rightly deplores . Flathman in the practice of political authority brings us closer as almost everyone has a good understanding of the political authority and its correlates , political and legal break obligations. But the threshold is yet to come .