By On Tuesday, September 3rd, 2013 Categories : Review

Professor Sluga starts things in giving us a much more complete account of the German philosophy of the nineteenth century , would I have read . Most analytic philosophers The first chapter of his book follows the focus of the German philosophy of logic and the development of Hegelian idealism to materialism and rationalism and empiricism naturalists. Naturalism leads to psychologism led Frege notorious controversy . Views in logic and mathematical formalism , which Mill’s empiricism is a form of naturalism as well. Sluga and can convincingly argue that Frege ‘s philosophy has not in response to transcendental idealism or objective , but rather against naturalism and idealism subjective guide . This sheds new light on the attacks on Frege ” idealism ” for example Grundgesetze / and places it in a position very different from that of Russell and Moore to British idealistic goals , Bradley and Bosanquet . The purpose of this second chapter is to show that Frege was not alone in this reaction and that even the most technical of his philosophy and his conception of logic and language issues are not fully developed hostile. Professor Sluga describes other reactions to neo – Kantian naturalism , positivism and critical phenomenology and says they share themes and philosophical hero with Frege . He then points out that the interest in Frege logic and the foundations of mathematics was motivated by questions of epistemology and his determination to a Kantian conception of mathematics a priori defend . This patented Frege letl develop . Formal language for mathematics and logic Sluga argues that Frege ‘s more inspiration for this in the writings of Leibniz which sloped idea of ??an ideal language is revived and combined with the Kantian distinction between form and content of thought. Meanwhile Sluga says Frege studied Lotze and snatched some designs for use in the philosophy of logic , namely aprioricity logic , the notion of objectivity , the principle that words meaning in the context of a proposal , the notion of a concept based and viewpoint that mathematics is part of logic . The third chapter of the book focuses on the design of Frege ‘s formal language of logic . Sluga believes that it is essential to compare it with other concepts of logic and language in effect ( Schroeder of Lotze , and the Mauthner ) , because ” the historical significance of the design is determined by Frege place it occupies among these alternatives ” (70). This gives a better appreciation of the innovations distribution Frege to various acts of judgment ( confirmation , denial) , a type of judgment ( assertion ) and propose various types , formalize logically only essential features of ordinary language , using propositional logic as basis , rejecting the distinction between subject and predicate , and the introduction of an adequate understanding of quantification . Sluga also uses this discussion to the technical innovations of Frege ‘s broader philosophical views . For example , the fundamental emphasis in propositional logic is related to the principle of the context and the view of concepts such as incomplete link . in the following chapters , which is also claimed to be incompatible with Tarski (180 ) semantics , and Frege ‘s assertion that there is only one type o ( judgment is said to be . incompatible with atomism (136 )
The third chapter focuses on the Begriffsschrifi , in the fourth chapter , the focus is on the Grundlagen . Design Frege logic as universal, the distinction between objectivity and reality and his notion of a logical object are thoroughly discussed and connected with Kant and Lotze . The chapter concludes with a discussion of Frege ‘s analysis of the number and the claim that reducing the number of positions left Frege program in an incomplete state as extensions was no evidence that the logical objects . This is seen as the reason mentioned in the book Grundlagen Frege due to the reduction of arithmetic to logic only very likely ( 102 ) . The fifth chapter is built around Shiga attempt to show that the theory of meaning and reference government ‘s mainly introduced to the gap on the status of a device to the left ( as Sluga ) close to the end of the Grundlagen , that i.e. , show that extensions of concepts are logical objects. In stark contrast to most of the tradition of Frege scholarship Sluga argues that Frege developed not address the theory of meaning and reference the problems of Extensionality and indirect speech but to explain why his axiom V , which governs extensions of concepts and other services varies value is logically true . The reason , in short, is that axiom is a non – identity is not a Biconditional as modern interpretations – and it is an identity in which the expressions on both sides of the identity signs have the same meaning as the reference . These identities have a clear title to the logical truth . The bulk of the chapter presents a standard exposure of Frege ‘s theory of meaning and reference , and the theory of functions and objects leads to the consideration of the axiom V. There are two notable exceptions . The first is tying Shiga these theories to small critical essay book known to Frege , “On the law of inertia . ” It Frege argues that the philosophical objections to the theory of absolute space of Newton was born out of She tries the principles of Newtonian theory linking individual data to the experience and the assumptions meaning when taken in combination . Sluga believes that it would be . Reaffirms the principle of the context of the Grundlagen Frege and the key to understanding the basics of semantic theories of Frege Thus Frege transition year confusing grammatical characteristics of predicates and functors to the incompleteness of concepts and functions is ” demonstrably justified by methodological considerations of the test ” or the linguistic distinction is ” fruitful and necessary for the logic , it should be something real or objective ” (140 ) represent . The second exception is the assertion of Sluga ‘s theory of meaning and reference semantics whole sentences rather than a theory of reference expression . the last and most common construal would , in the opinion of Shiga , not only contrary to the principle of context , but would also ” the effect of assigning an important role to empirical objects” and have ” it seems doubtful that this objects never played an important role in the thought of Frege “(159 ) . Russell contradiction in Frege ‘s philosophy and the relationship of Frege to Russell , Carnap and Wittgenstein . The important point here is how is not Fregean analytic philosophy came to be in the hands of a return to empiricism , realism and atomism .
The presentation of the thought of Frege Sluga also firmly rooted in idealism and rationalism in the German and continuous development is original , well forged and carefully studied . It was to pass on what I have devoted to summarize. His book a large part of this short review I think on behalf of the pre – 1891 Frege both informative and persuasive , but I strongly disagree with the idealistic Sluga reading the post – 1891 , Frege , and their views on the theory of meaning and reference and place in Frege ‘s philosophy. Philosophy of mathematics my skin Frege ‘ s ( Cornell , 1980 ) I have argued against that Sluga ( maybe) Frege began as an idealist , but he was a realist . 1 do not see the need to pull this vision , but I have to admit that Sluga made ??his case as long as my own book still incomplete .
The procedure now , it seems, is to try to more precisely determine what is the difference between idealism and realism comes when applied to the philosophy of Frege . Sluga admits that Frege later is compatible with a realistic game , but adds that it must be rejected if it is ” concerned with historical accuracy . ” But on the same page (60 ) , he noted that Frege took Kant and Leibniz selective . Later he made ??the same remark about Lotze . This in turn casts a shadow on the argument of the historical accuracy because it is possible that decided then select Kant and Frege no Lotze idealism . The second difficulty is to understand that idealism Frege thought arises in the context of its vision as abstract numbers . objects is not only a point where there is no express agreement with Kant , but it is not clear that there is a consistent objective idealist theory of abstract entities . Shiga refers to the ” reformulation of the Platonic theory of ideas as an ontology without objectivity theory” (53 ) Lotze all useful is patchy . There are many points in this book that deserves careful study and evaluation . I’ve only been able to get my main criticism of the present . This is not a book for the student at the beginning of Frege , but 1:00 to ensure that anyone with a basic understanding of his teachings to a challenging and rewarding work to find .

GOTTLOB FREGE | ok-review | 4.5