BEITZ ON RAWLS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE

By On Tuesday, September 17th, 2013 Categories : Review

PTIR is divided into three pieces. In the first aspect, Beitz repudiates the realist as well as neo-realist theories of international relations as a Hobbesian state of nature where moral judgments cannot be reproduced. Beitz demonstrates that the realists’ Hobbesian view is empirically false and in theory untenable. In the minute part, Beitz argues against a widely held view he characterizes because “autonomy of states. ” That is a view maintained by Erina Walzer (1977, 1992), and others, to the effect that will states have rights involving autonomy that insulate these individuals from external moral review and political interference by other states. Beitz argues instead that a theory of international relations ought to include a revised principle of state autonomy using the justice of states’ domestic institutions. In the third section of the book, Beitz makes a strikingly daring application in the logic of John Rawls’ contractarian arguments in a very Theory of Justice (1971). Applying the logic involving Rawls’ original position as well as veil of ignorance on the international sphere, Beitz yields a cosmopolitan transformation involving Rawls’ theory.
Beitz argues that a correct application of Rawls’ reason justifies a resource distribution principle and also a global difference principle to establish a fair division involving resources and wealth among persons tucked within diverse national societies. In PTIR, Beitz criticizes Rawls by arguing that, even if were to assume with Rawls that will states are separate selfcontained organisations, their representatives meeting in a very second original position may not accept the principles Rawls envisages. Specifically, Beitz argues contra Rawls that will representatives of states may not agree to a basic principle confirming that natural resources belong to the states whose territories encompass them. The existing distribution involving natural resources is morally arbitrary so that no state deserves its resource endowment. Thus, unsure whether their own expresses were resource-rich or certainly not, riskaverse representatives would insist upon a principle that distributed resources equally through some kind of world-wide wealth tax. However, Beitz moves on to argue in PTIR that will, because of interdependence, states can’t be treated as selfcontained organisations as Rawls had assumed. There is no need for a second contract involving state representatives as Rawls had suggested in a very Theory of Justice. As a substitute, the logic of Rawls’ theory of justice need to be applied worldwide. In addition on the equal liberty principle, parties in a international original position would pick a global difference principle. No separate principle governing resources will be needed, as the global difference principle causes it to be superfluous.
The global change principle would apply throughout international society as Rawls’ change principle applies in domestic society. It is the internationally least advantaged represented group whose position have to be improved if significant inequalities have to be allowed among societies. While using publication of The Legislation of Peoples (1999), Rawls continued to insist that societies have to be seen for the reasons of theory as self-contained cooperative plans for mutual advantage. For more than a decade, the efforts involving Beitz, Rawls, and other people (e. g., Pogge 1989, 2002; Caney 2002; Buchanan 2004) to establish foundations for global justice were being among the most widely debated topics throughout political theory and viewpoint. Although interdependence throughout the globe has greatly increased considering that the 1970s when Beitz authored, it is still suggested by some critics involving Beitz that relations involving affluent and poor international locations cannot be seen when it comes to the mutual cooperation and reciprocity necessary to think about global society in the best way appropriate for application of your contractarian theory of justice. However, in his 1983 report “Cosmopolitan Ideals and Nationwide Sovereignty, ” Beitz already had moved faraway from a contractarian approach as well as was grounding cosmopolitanism over a Kantian account of the moral equality of persons and adopting the movement of Rawls’ later on thought in Rawls’ Dewey Talks. (Beitz addresses this change in perspective inside Afterword of the 1999 model of PTIR. )

BEITZ ON RAWLS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE | ok-review | 4.5