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1) ofthe distinction between positive and negative freedom : Crocker Gerald MacCallum follows considering that the two types can be understood in terms of the same triadic relation: [ Agent ] x is ( is not ) without doing ( do not , can not be ) 2. The difference between the negative and positive freedom is actually gradually . ” The promoter of positive freedom requires a long list of ” avoid situations ” (eg , for a wider range of variable y ) , and , perhaps, for a wide range of two- variable (p . 5 ) .

2 ) Crocker began his argument ( § 4 ) a positive balance of freedom to note that the conventional negative accounts ( eg Hobbes ) depend on a distinction between stress ( which is a non – is free) and disability (that’s a can , not free ) . Crocker argues that this distinction is not yet in a way that at – founded prevents intuitive or paradoxical results . I ‘m a little hesitant about this argument , because it does not pay enough attention to the difference between situational barriers and restraint . It goes by very quickly , some 011 judgments if a hard head would dispute . Negativist

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3 ) The story of coercion ( § 5 ) is much more powerful . Crocker argues convincingly that , except in the simplest cases , coercion is not an ‘all or nothing’ thing , it is a ” matter of degree. ” To say that one is free to do so. T (in the sense of unbound ) is that one is free to some extent x . He later plead that all counsequence itself not embarrass negative libertarians , it contributes substantially to the case to say that “total freedom” of an individual is a matter of degree . And that , he believes , are a painful outcome for negativistic .

4 ) The next step ( § 7 ) is to claim that it never completely free to do whatever the degree of freedom depends on the success that we are trying to do . This results in some awkwardness , but the argument is persuasive .

5 ) Chapter III deals with the complex issue of the relationship between ” internal states ” (belief , desire) to freedom. Here , the aim is to Crocker that those states are under the ” conditions ” under which variable to avoid them in the formula MacCallum certain time and they make too much freedom is a matter of degree . The arguments here are a bit annoying , but usually worth it.

6 ) Crocker then turn to the question of ” total freedom ” , that is , the analysis of what it is to be a free agent , period, rather than free to do something extraordinary. Though some moral issues for this type ol question , evaluation of social structures often involves assessing the size of the total freedom of the people And then there is what appears to be a crucial move Crocker plans to an account of freedom – . . as – build thing – precious – for – the – individual , which is the freedom to interpret ” tend ” to be true that more is better than less he believes some arguments between positive and negative libertarians have to deal with this matter of definition ( p. 48 ) . . I’m not convinced . this movement is defined in the beginning as if it must be important, but nothing in the discussion of Crocker convinces me it is. so I am surprised why he is on him.

7 ) ” total freedom ” is the next topic . It has two aspects : personal freedom and social freedom . Each consists of a complex of factors and gradual. Personal freedom ( Chapter IV ) is determined by the number, variety and the likelihood of alternatives , and the only suspicious movement Crocker is done here to collapse these factors relate to the negative libertarian about human intervention in freedom. Strategy Crocker , again, enter the negative / positive distinction so that a difference of degree than of kind . So it will be easier , he thinks, to show that there is no good reason to hold on to any negative freedom institutionalize the line .

8 ) Chapter V reveals Crocker positive component included in the account of the social freedom . Although freedom was not a matter of degree , the social freedom defines as follows :

1 ) is socially free to do X if and only if A is itself free to v

2 ) is socially unfree to do X if and only if / t is not free personal anti v – A would personally free to A. to rely on an alternative social organization ( p. 67) . Because non-interference is merged into the other with individual freedom , there is no further purchases for refusing to call ” social unfreedom ” disability resulting from a physical ( in society where rehabilitation is ignored ) When the formulation of social freedom is changed according to the degrees of freedom into account ( p. 67 ) , is even clearer .

9 ) After the property has been granted ( as it can certainly negative libertarian not ) , then the arbitration ( ie , accepting more government intervention to overcome ) obstacles to other elements of total freedom seem very natural, and opens the way for a wide version of a libertarian positive program – for example with regard to income redistribution .

10 ) Chapter VI deals with the criticism of positive freedom in itself , and aims to show that this criticism does not affect the definition of the Crocker . To The crucial issue is the burden Crocker ignored special pain compulsion and coercion ( by equating disability correctable ) . Crocker examines and rejects different versions . The charge that compulsion and coercion are special because they willful misconduct or because they to another to impose the will of an agent can be rapidly eliminated with classic counter – examples to demonstrate that the refusal Assist or permit can be as malicious , deliberate and devastating direct interference , and the refusals to impose another . also wants an agent The charge that compulsion and coercion are special because they are particularly violates human rights will also be rejected , but here the argument Crocker is much more vulnerable . His strategy is to (especially requires intuition ) there is a positive human rights ( eg , to provide assistance ) , and positive rights to it can be used legally. If the load of human rights is a very important line of attack against the entire project Crocker , he deserves much more careful than what is in the eight pages are devoted to care ( p . 101-109 ) possible.

11 ) The remaining chapters consider the value of freedom (Chapter VII ) and the costs and limitations (Chapter VIII ) . The first is the most superficial in the book , and this ( although this may be due simply to my limits ) was by far the least interesting . In my case , they can be omitted without damaging what is otherwise a clear and enlightening volume .

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