KANT’S THEORY OF MIND: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON
Treatment Chapter fallacies in English is a useful contribution to Kant scholarship . Based on the non – critical discussions , especially recently published lecture notes , a Ameriks gifts ( are historical development from the perspective of Kant on various topics related to the spirit of the industry; immateriality , interaction , identity , immortality , and independence . idealism Ameriks argues that our understanding of the fallacies chapter is hampered by nol witnessed the evolution of the thinking of Kant abotn itself. I think the report shows that commentators unusual effort to have had sense discussed . , in many cases in this part of the Critique , the reference to Kant a ” principle of life ” ( A345 / 11403 ) , for example , shows how Ameriks awareness themes and theses conferences Kant can illuminate the issues in addition to the explicit themes of the four fallacies , Ameriks provide otherwise almost unreadable . on related issues were obvious concern of Kant . has found that the freedom of the will (independence ) is not covered by the ” rational psychology ” particularly useful. I While the general point that Ameriks fallacies must be understood in the broader context of the development of Kant ‘s undeniable , its specific historical thesis considerable debate . Can Ameriks believes that Chapter fallacies is much less unpleasant to rationalist dogma seems . Specifically , it reads Kant as quite favorable immaterialism even during the critical phase . The argument in favor of this interpretation is complicated , but it seems to have three major carriers . First , conferences Kant favor immaterialism during and after the critical period (pp. 46-47 ) . Secondly , Ameriks believes that many of the apparent attack on Kant immaterialism should be understood as a criticism of its doctrine ol pneumatism and spiritualism ( p. 36 , see also page 45 , 91 , 97 , 146 , 182 ) . Finally. Ameriks opinion that Kant does not support strong objections to the arguments for immaterialism . The crucial argument for immaterialism those labels “argument of unity ” Ameriks , occupies a place in the second fallacy in A The basic idea of the argument is , to date, very familiar. Because thoughts have a certain unit, the various components of a thought (say , the words in a sentence ) can not be combined in different fabrics , so that a composite can not think ( A352 ) . Ameriks says Kant .. fails to provide the precise objection to the argument of the unit .. ( P. 63) , however, specify , this is the first observation of Kant’s argument … unity of thinking, which consists of many performances , is collective, and where simple concepts can show , both the collective unity of different fabrics together to act … influence the absolute unity of the subject ” ( A353 ) . During the general discussion of Kant’s argument unit is complicated , this replica is clear and direct. ‘s single (potentially ) confounding factor is that Kant offers with tie coup with his first shot . Moreover, by Kant also live on the various arguments concerning the simplicity that are used to build the case for immateriality . example, he noted that , in the only sense in which ” I am simply ” the assembly ” means nothing more than this representation T , does not in itself (unless manifoidness .. ( A355 ) , and that this argument can be derived from the actual simplicity of my subject ( A355 ) .
Ameriks would react if Kant did criticize some arguments for the immateriality , it can still positive about the position itself . However , 1 think there is decisive textual evidence against the basic approach of the first two fallacies Ameriks as sympathetic to immaterialism In a long note in the second edition , Kant those non-empirical objects full invent properties doctrinal practices . Mocked Side point is that anyone can play this game and it starts to set merge simple substances undergo fission , and disappear ( B416 – 417b ) . The attack concludes : Another major project of interpreting Ameriks is a partial defense of Kantian idealism itself. Ameriks do not think Kant is just as phenomenal looking car , but he argues that the complaint again that the position of Kant is simply incoherent is unfair. The interpretation of Kant saving inconsistency is the ” theory of the case . ” According to this theory , is a transcendental idealist about yourself is to conclude that in perspective , the self that the time is displayed our limited point of view, no time (pp. 265-266 ) . The noumenal self does not cause himself to appear as a time in the beginning, though, as all aspects of the phenomenon that ultimately ” reasonable” to noumena ( p. 281 ) . In addition, many of Kant comments on the work of the self-reflection does not exceed the limits noumenon is called . Certain without car “On the contrary , the ” spontaneity “of the subject in Kant contains mainly that structures experience above objectives because they can not be understood as mere effects of individual experiences .. (p . 289 ) .
Despite some interesting features , the theory of the species are facing many challenges . This is not the forum for a full discussion , but I will highlight three obvious problems . The burden of the famous charge of PF Strawson of transcendental idealism is that when Kant says that the phenomenal properties of experiences are caused by forms of sensibility , can not be said that self noumenal experience to spatial temporal.2 a request hat is both inconsistent a timeless being can not occur , and incompatible with the idea that noumenon is unknowable . On the other hand , it is desperately unsure what else Kant might mean by such statements. J do not see how the challenge can be met Strawson replaced by the embarrassing doctrine of ” dual disorder ” with IHE developed suggestion that noumena appearances ” support ” ( p. 266 ) , or sham ” because ” noumena ( p. 281 ) . Second, the presentation of the theory of species contain a vicious ambiguity . theory is the origin is described as a feature is phenomenal as ” [ i ] t is not part . tile itself, regardless of the limited resources it could be seen” ( p. 266 ) In defense of the theory , however Ameriks offers following caveat : our temporality is ” phenomenal, because it is something … [ we ] would have missed without which we could not find adequate observed ” ( p. 2821 , the first version of the theory of types , our temporality is an illusion . Secondly , it is true, but not essential . Finally , I think the theory of types offer a bad deal on the issue of spontaneity . Ameriks deny that many of Kant’s comments on the activities of the self imply that the same real are characterized by spontaneity , individual to the doctrine that noumenon is to maintain . Unknowable So he is forced to bind almost poignant comments interpret “I exist as an intelligence which is conscious only of his power to combination ” ( B158 -159 ) .. and thanks to this spontaneity that I an intelligence ” called ( B158a ) as metaphorical I . ( for empirical sale is not spontaneous, or ( p. ‘289 ) . ) Hut of this approach is insurmountable problems for the rest of the philosophy of Kant . because without any control over what we are (eg , spontaneous thought things ) , other surveys Kant about whether we are free and morally responsible and perhaps immortal no sense . one of the biggest problems in Kant fallacies is that it has both the identity of the real me with the thinking thing “and retain full unknowable things in themselves . compromises I think, say that the constitution of things thinking is completely unknown. by scammers , Ameriks solves the problem by Kant fores wear some knowledge of all the features of the same noumenal , even if they have one or more . Kant I have his stool with verve profession , if not incoherent philosophical position . Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that Kant prepared to the mental health of the ethical and religious views would be in danger to save transcendental idealism .