ON JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY
Nelson argues that there are different forms of government that can legitimately be called democratic. It begins with a definition that ” close to our pre – theoretical conception enough ” democracy , he said, in terms of procedures should be established and a system of government decision-making , but there is no such thing . as a “pre – theoretical ” design . Nelson, in the spirit of Rawls used often means ” natural ” interpretation of democracy and “our” interpretations , but are intuitive ” definition data can appear to us ” pre – theoretical ‘ as it seems obvious and consistent with a healthy sense ‘ , because our political way to organize, in a manner that ( almost) already exists . Defining Nelson is a strong revisionist point and illustrates the extreme difficulty of maintaining the separation of the provision and evaluation (instead of a distinction between them ) , which his argument is based . argument is made of abstract theoretical perspective individualistic part of the Liberal government and patriarchal – capitalist society as revisionists and Kelson , call ” democracy . ” The main chapters of the book contain valid arguments and think about , for example , the majority rule , consensus and maintaining the status quo . Individualistic presuppositions Nelson also lead to an interpretation of popular sovereignty as nothing more than the social problem of protection based on the aggregation of individual preferences , and a subjectivist interpretation of autonomy , which is heavily dependent on Wolff ‘s In defense of anarchism . The least satisfactory part of the argument is the treatment of political obligation . Nelson discusses consent in the context of participation and die strangely assumes that reject the agreement restricts the freedom of citizens to the immoral policy . In the last chapter , devoted to the political commitment , there is no question of consent . The Nelson consequenualisi approach strictly requires an argument of ” obedience ” , not ” required ” ( and permission , as I have said elsewhere, is associated with it) , but , although n ‘ there is no recognition of the ibis , the logical lor Nelson 10 provides a discussion of utilitarianism ( useful for those interested in the acts and rules ) . It also fully supports the principle of fairness which is a conceptual rather than a Rawlsian argument .
Nelson points out that participatory theories are ” radically incomplete ” because they are not based on a legal theory that participationists spent to specify the effect of individual participation in education and to justify in detail sufficient attention. Many of his objections to participation , however, appear as a force is believed that if the theoretical point of view is accepted . This does not mean that significant problems for participatory theories are not high, but it is far from clear that they can be solved by following the procedure for educational argument ( borrow albeit in a somewhat weakened form ) Nelson and add a revisionist view of democracy assumes that the structure of social class and gender relations is largely irrelevant to politics. Nelson commented that the reason for the satisfaction of individual preferences will be ” 011 depends on the precise structure of the bargaining problem to the citizens ” , but there is little evidence that he assumed that the public debate and open government in the absence of other radical social change , will do much to the working class , indigenous and women for their just demands to help . Nelson also argues that the political debate consensus 011 moral principles ” may be admitted by free and independent people will promote public . ” But who are these people : women are included among those necessary for their existence is Nelson notes that it is possible that a consensus if not – could arise failure procedures of the law and policy background ? . Empirically , the contractual minimum individualistic society – state , Nelson welcomes in different places in the book , it is likely that it would be on the border of the agreement – that much of his argument would undermine the moral effects of democracy and the requirement that all individual preferences are also worthy of satisfaction . This limit is consistent with the account of Nelson morality as ” a set of principles that can serve the public charter a well-ordered society. ” Indeed , this abstract definition can be accepted by a participatory theorist , although deep disagreements arise over the interpretation and the good old human damage , the content of the principles and their relationship as a political morality , the moral principles governing personal lile Nelson noted that the revisionists seem participationists other questions. Over the years , I came to the conclusion that they are competing for less than two very different theoretical perspectives on two contradictory conceptions of democracy , and therefore it will not agree on the substantive justification Nelson show how design can revisionist lie defended ; . participatory theorists to the challenge .