In Chapter I , Teller analyzes the concept that they are ” calling in life happiness . ” To this happiness to achieve ( i ) it must ” not something important like in (one of) his life differently, ” ( ii ) must are ” satisfied that … (A ) has obtained , ” and ( iii) ” nothing important that (a ) is not satisfied and that ( a)” ( p. 8 ) . Although , she says , these conditions are not sufficient , a person can be ” satisfied with all the different elements that make up his life , but still insist that there is something wrong , ” without being able to say what lo . Thus, an additional condition is added: . A happy man is happy not only with the ” different aspects of his life , ” but his ” life as a whole” ( p. 8 ) And when she said that this state of satisfaction with life as a whole constitutes happiness, with other words , ” happiness in life ” is a state of mind , and ( i ) , ( ii ) and ( iii ) are necessary conditions for achieving it. Equipped with this definition . Teller went on to say that a category error was created by the accusations as ” happiness consists in the exercise of virtue or the pursuit of knowledge ” ( p. 9 ) . to happiness is a state of mind , those who identify with the activities or acquisitions say these things produce happiness , they are not happy. Additionally Telfer said , a person who says he is genuinely happy thai his right (pp. 9-10 ) . his life is perhaps unfortunate, and therefore lack eudaimonia , but because happiness is a mental fade, ” a man is itself the authority on whether he is happy ” (p . 9 ) . One difficulty with this view is that man is not an authority as a condition ( iii ) are met: one can be satisfied with life as a whole , but it can (for example) n does not have the popularity that he wants and thinks he has . It will be the speaker mental state is identified with happiness, but because it does not satisfy the condition ( iii ) , it will not be happy . In any case, I see no reason to regard as ” happiness consists in the exercise of virtue , ” as a category errors such statements. We often use “happiness ” is made by the assertion that a happy life consists in the exercise of virtue. Interchangeably with ” a happy life ” , and certainly no error category Trying to achieve a happy Jife is no longer pursuing a mentality that seeks to achieve a happy marriage.1 Elfer claims that it is not unreasonable for his own happiness for the sake of duty to sacrifice , “but it is irrational to sacrifice happiness ” , who own preferences and wishes are only concerned ” ( p. 108 ) . Here , I find a to show that happiness can be sacrificed , some ambiguity in his theory , it cites several examples , including the following : . ( a) ” a man deliberately and intentionally sacrificed her happiness to seek revenge or to a girl with whom he is in love marry , but with whom he sees , he never seems happy … ” ( b ) ” a man can arrange his life to the pursuit of a goal that away from happiness. For example, searching for the truth … ” ( P. 23 ) 1 suspect Telfer What is ( a) to be irrational and ( b ) it is rational , which is why the difference . ? Happiness is irrational to sacrifice for the sake of passion , but not for love a rigorous ideal? , and what is the difference between these two types of motivation ? maybe Telfer simply means that when we sacrifice happiness because of the ideals and passions , and then later not regret our decision , we acted irrationally But that would be a difficult position defend his : . ? . why not say that sometimes the car more later reversed the sacrifice of the first self- happiness regret There is also a weakness in the argument Telfer we have a prima facie duty to pursue happiness They spac we the duty to respect , including ourselves , and the respect that we should try to make his life. harmoniously each person , but I ‘m not convinced that a person who fails to achieve happiness , or decision to sacrifice , the under severe psychological conflicts . I come now to the discussion of eudaimonia Telfer , namely the kind of life that a “good specimen of human life in its most rich ” offers ( p. 50) . Eudaimon Life is one in which the ingredients that are objectively justified in itself , not only as a means to dominate most ol life contains these ingredients , the more the person eudaimonia . Telfer says that we promote a prima facie duty to eudaimonia in our own lives and in the lives of others . because we think that people blame when they waste their talents without sufficient reason , and we believe that children should be educated not only to be happy, but to find happiness in life is objectively valid . Taxes used to promote cultural activities can not be justified ” a purely hedonistic utilitarian perspective , but they can be defended if we have a duty to promote eudaimonia , and if the government has the right to ” carry out of our moral duties ( whether we recognize ) it should be. . best by government action ” (pp. 134-35 ) .
What activities ingredients eudaivumia ol ? And how can demonstrate that such activity is an ingredient ? Telfer think ” the aesthetic and scientific activity , the exercise of moral virtue and the cultivation of personal relationships ” are good in themselves ( p. 62 ) , and tests to see if they can these intuitions Criterion she finally attaches LOR possible criteria of goodness represent this : “there are certain types of behavior which will be unlike a (weak ) human animal ” , these activities are part of our ol ‘ of . distinctive human endowment ” ( a phrase she borrows Mill ) and should be encouraged as an ingredient in eudaimonia ( p. 69) The basic idea . , Telfer said , can be done in three different ways . Firstly, we could ” set a value certain qualities and abilities of man , as the word ” endowment ” suggests , and we think they can all be adopted by the idea because ol …. In this context, our evaluation is based the form of ” the exercise of reason in itself ” and people are measured in a manner that is derived from it. Second, it can be suggested that the basic intuition is that value human species as particularly valuable . the value that we would be diverted , on the activities of the reason, and could be obtained in a ( relatively ) neutral assessment of the value , which has the characteristics of the humans were so different from other animals their life . I liirdly could imagine … each part of creation has its own role to play and we see every kind of see this role that the activity is not carried out as this species does not exist ” (pp. 69-70 ) . Regardless of the approach ( and I Elfer not choose between them ) . Because proves valuable , and as intellectual activity shows reasonable investigation are prominent among them are the ingredients of eudaimonia to a certain extent , says Telfer , aesthetic activity and the exercise of moral virtue can be considered as a manifestation of reason, but she says they are also valid for the exercise of our imagination , which is part of the donation of the man no less characteristic that reason. The practice of friendship is justified as a part of life is worth it , because in these relationships that we our creative ability to the position of the other to enter . There are some serious problems for the theory. For starters , Telfer seems to indicate that the exercise of reason is valid in itself. . . pace Kant , we can even afford ” the coolness of a villain ” to be good in itself, although the law is wrong with this ” (p. 74 ) . Unlike Aristotle , is the ” ability to find ways to end so … is good in itself ” ( p. 74) . Telfer As I understand it , then , someone who finds happiness in adding long columns of figures , and a lot of free time to do so, leads a life of eudaimonia , since such an activity that its ‘ distinctive human endowment ” has predominates in his life . yet something strange , because it says that ” the man who eudaimonia a good example of human life in its richest … or … it is good for human life ” ( p. 50) But we are not inclined to these words apply to the most – addict; . but most people say he leads a poor life Telfer How would they deal with this problem suggests (pp. 79 , 102 ) who live not only differ by the degree to which they are dedicated to . ? useful activities, but also in the ” wealth” of eudaimonia they present . but what amount of “wealth ” ‘s ? If one is the reasoning of the best B , means that a higher degree of goodness comes in a life as he thinks ? has an excellent chess have a life more interesting than the one in the middle , all things being equal ? The fundamental problem is , I think, is the statement that ” the exercise of reason is good in itself ( p. 69 ) , because it is certain that an exaggeration to say that any use of reason ( or imagination for that matter) is valid . other possibilities are considered pages 69-70 (quoted two paragraphs above ) are more plausible .. We do not know what it means Telfer assertion that the human species is a ” unique value ” , or how this application can be defended of course , human life is especially important people – . Bui is the valuable simpliciter and why certain activities that other species show that this is not the time to take part in them ? Telfer has to complicate his theory contrary to intuition when it comes to the place of pleasure in life Eudaimon (pp. 91-97 ) . On the one hand , it insists that pleasure is ” a good thing in a sense , the fact that someone is happy … have a prima facie right of review have … when other people decide what to do ” ( p. 94). On the other hand , is the pleasure enjoyed by many lower animals , and thus Telfer ” not see how to behave with pleasure … for” distinctive characteristics of man staffing ” ‘ ( p. 97) . “As a fun seems to be no other than to produce aspect have fun, then it is not good in itself ( p. 97) . In other words , the fun is not an objectively justifiable objective , even if it is a goal that the reasons offers . the pleasure is sought, and to study the needs of others that claim but an ingredient in eudaimonia are , something has argued like, regardless of the fact that he is wanted . (See pages 95 , 122 ) . Here for action leaves Telfer Mill , because ” the whole tenor of [his ] mind is something that is not desirable because we want ” ( p. 63) . She wants an evaluation method that is ” not subject to empirical facts of human nature ” (p . 41 ) . these facts tell us what activities are likely to make us happy, but they will not tell us that these activities are profitable .
It is this abstraction of empirical eventually causes problems Telfer , certainly our gratitude to various intellectual and artistic activities is rooted in the historical circumstances that otherwise might have been. To ensure that these activities are profitable , should be made to our history and traditions that give us life. Shape Outside of these cases there is no reason why the value of a scientific discovery or an artwork on long division or any other activity that reason and imagination used . Telfer is quite right to the fact that happiness , in the personal sense, is not a standard of value to emphasize . And it is right to emphasize that education is an appreciation of the worthy goals should inspire . But these objectives are valid , because they are part of our culture , and there is not an abstract point of view, outside band of worship , where the success of education , or the life of a person can be judged .