To feel the power of the position of Blum , just compare a regular thing to help the person someone with a very special case of someone doing : S pays example , for $ 3 per meal stranger who realizes that his wallet lost against V enters someone’s house , which was engulfed in flames , and saving the life of the child of that person . Neither act is morally obligatory. But certainly N is what is morally good and the explanation is simple : / Act V supererogatory1 Needless to say , if that is 5 morally good, the explanation of which can hardly be the same . And if , as claimed by Blum , the Kantian moral tradition that all morally worthy actions are morally obligatory or supererogatory , then there is simply no room for this 6 ‘ morally good . In addition, although S can certainly be made ??a universal and impartial perspective , so they do not ring true that this is an explanation of why S does or why he does it is morally right . Or , at least , as Blum accusations . Of course , by what Kant called imperfect obligations ( ie obligations or to a particular person , or to be made in a specific way [ for example, the duty of charity ] ) it is possible for acts that are motivated by altruistic emotions have a moral value . But this is because , strictly speaking , such acts are better characterized as somehow morally obliged instead of morally good simpliciter , because imperfect duties as perfect, are derived from universal and impartial set of rules . ” There is simply no space on the views of Kant, moral actions have no moral right somehow . More specifically , there is no place for acts have a moral value as the only explanation of their performance is that they are motivated by altruistic feelings . Blum has no problem with universality , impartiality and moral criteria for good deeds , which he rejects , but rather the view that the act is morally right if it is morally right or supererogatory . While the moral philosophy of Kant undoubtedly has its faults , is not Kant see the need to provide criteria both act – assessment and evaluation officer and that they parasitic on the first . However , when it comes to moral good deeds , Blum writes as if it will be the first. But for at least two reasons , this argument is misleading : ( PI ) The welfare of others is a moral ( 27 ) . ( P2 ) means of altruistic action , by definition , only acting on an immediate problem for the good of the other ( 87 , 91 ) . ( C3 ) By acting altruistically , a person does what in fact is morally good . There is the obvious fact that a person about what is right for one person may be wrong. More to the point, however, if the word “good ” in the premises can be said of any act that helps a person to achieve a goal, then it is simply wrong to say that every good act is morally good due to the fact that it was motivated by altruistic emotions . After all , we compassionate and generous. If by compassion , I always borrow my friend rent money every time he wasted gambling pay his week ( it’s legal ), I’m in the way of the person responsible is that it should be , and therefore can not be said to do what morally good for him , though neither his game nor my loan him the rent money is a moral fault of a , sort of . Certainly , there is no infringement of here . When, then , is a moral good deed ? Well, the answer is not easy when it is motivated by altruistic feelings . And there is not even a hint of an answer in the book .
Now, the example of borrowing money also suggest that the criteria for Blum agent evaluation should be more involved in. Because of course my compassion in any case not speak well of me . Indeed , it would seem possession of every virtue positive thinking about the moral character of a only if sufficient discriminatory in its display of this virtue , as the virtue of a error . An agent account – assessment is incomplete if it does not address these issues , and it seems that it can not be done in the absence of a bill of law – evaluation . Blum believes that the case illustrates the friendship , the more powerful both the accuracy of the moral vision of the good deeds that are urged upon us and the failure of the Kantian conception of morality . Of all the friends first biased to another. Second , it is not moved to the many friends are morally good actions they perform on behair together. From a sense of duty 111 In conjunction with these observations , we consider that the friendship is a very profound and important aspect of our lives , Blum seems to be free by stating that if the friendship presents insurmountable problems for the moral and Kant thought sure. However, I believe that if the friendship is not used Blum and he is inclined to think , despite the fact that so much of what Blum said about this relationship is extremely subtle and enlightening. The problem is as follows . As Blum designs morally good deeds , they are in no way morally necessary , our performance of them is completely optional . But the altruistic emotions or , more precisely , the care and concern that friends have for another , are not optional features of friendship . Two people who are indifferent to each other are not only bad friends ( which is not to lie confused with bad friendships ) , they are not friends at all. Blum and I are of one mind here . But one would think that if the concern and care are not optional features of friendship , then neither are all morally good deeds they generate. This seems to be with our intuitions . Match There are things that we consider our friends ( close ) , as opposed to mere acquaintances and strangers , must for us and what they first put us ( behind their families , for example) . Note that we have the same right as I do that we are one of the first to know of our friends on their luck . If in a particular case , we are the last to know , we often feel disrespected and hurt us , and if it happens often enough , maybe we need to assess . The depth of friendship again And in case of a disaster , we certainly believe that our friends beneficial for us to be a person to lose a husband is not only a good thing his best friends would comfort him to do that . All these things are part of the demands of friendship . Now , if we stick to that friendships are more like voluntary commitments we accept , then the idea that there are bonds of friendship is in no way contrary to the altruistic donation itself, which is the hallmark of friendship . The bonds of friendship may have to source the altruistic emotions . Just consider the case of a promise to see that this is the case . The fulfillment of a promise is not a case of less voluntarily put themselves in , because the obligation is motivated by altruistic emotions die . Neither the fact that there is now a requirement does not make it less true, that is motivated by altruistic to do what we need to do emotions . I agree with Blum that there are significant tensions between friendship and the Kantian conception of morality . Think of the development and the formation of friendships can not , as one might conclude that , plausible reading of Kant are peripheral to achieve moral perfection . However, if the idea that friendships are voluntary commitments point in the right direction , then the characterization of the source of these tensions Blum may well be too wide brand . More generally , I think there is more to say about what Kant called the imperfect duties Blum seems willing to allow . A person who is not moved to an act of charity to do would someone be relatively insensitive and I would have thought we morally should be very insensitive people , showing hardly follow that we should morally to acts of charity carry on the decline a hat .
But even if this evaluation Procrustes Blum ‘s book is solid , it has yet written a provocative essay in moral psychology , which fills a very important gap . Indeed , many contemporary moral philosophy seems to lose sight of the fact that the presence and display emotions are very much a part of it to have lost a person. Blum ‘s book gives us a tremendous sense of , and appreciation for the difficulties of the declaration of this fact , the moral point of view .